Mitchell Hamline Law Review
Volume 48

Issue 2

Article 6

2022

Should the Call for Systemic Change Start with Police Grievance
Arbitration?
Kate Fredrickson

Follow this and additional works at: https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections
Commons

Recommended Citation
Fredrickson, Kate (2022) "Should the Call for Systemic Change Start with Police Grievance Arbitration?,"
Mitchell Hamline Law Review: Vol. 48 : Iss. 2 , Article 6.
Available at: https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol48/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law Reviews and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open
Access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mitchell
Hamline Law Review by an authorized administrator of
Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information,
please contact sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

SHOULD THE CALL FOR SYSTEMIC CHANGE START WITH
POLICE GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION?
Kate Fredrickson

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 625
II.
HISTORY ........................................................................... 626

A. Grievance Arbitration......................................................... 626
B. What Is Just Cause? ........................................................... 627
C. Minnesota Arbitration Awards ........................................... 630
1. City of Duluth and Duluth Police Union, Local
No. 807 ................................................................................ 630
2. City of Sauk Rapids, Minnesota and Law Enforcement
Labor Services, Inc. ............................................................. 634
D. Public Policy Exception ..................................................... 637
E. Minnesota Supreme Court ................................................. 638

III.

THE PROBLEM .................................................................. 642

IV.

MINNESOTA’S RECENT CHANGES ................................... 646

V.
VI.

RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................... 654
CONCLUSION .................................................................... 655

A. Minnesota Police Departments .......................................... 642
B. Other Police Departments Nationwide ............................. 644

A. Police Accountability Act of 2020 ...................................... 648
B. The Minneapolis Police Department Process ................... 651
C. Alternative Options ............................................................ 653

2022]

POLICE GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION

I.

625

INTRODUCTION

Police grievance arbitrations play a major role in whether police
officers keep or lose their jobs following discipline imposed by the police
department they work for. 1 In May 2020, Minneapolis, Minnesota and the
rest of the nation erupted after watching one Minneapolis Police
Department (“MPD”) officer with numerous prior misconduct complaints
murder George Floyd, which drew attention to the police discipline
process. 2 Cell phone footage showed one officer murdering Mr. Floyd with
three other MPD officers standing by watching. 3 The video footage sparked
large protests against police brutality and systemic racism across the
country. 4 This Article focuses on the statutes and statutory changes
governing police grievance arbitrations in Minnesota, which is relevant to
jurisdictions around the country. 5
Police grievance arbitrations were at the forefront of conversations on
social media and in the Minnesota Legislature in 2020. 6 Police union labor
contracts with cities, specifically the disciplinary grievance appeals process
that is required in police contracts, have come under intense public
scrutiny. 7 The grievance procedure gives police officers the right to appeal
any disciplinary action, including written reprimand, suspension, transfer,
demotion, or discharge if the employee has completed the required
probationary period. 8 This practice is commonplace across the country. 9
See Shaila Dewan & Serge F. Kovaleski, Thousands of Complaints Do Little to Change
Police Ways, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/30/us/derek-

1

chauvin-george-floyd.html [https://perma.cc/477G-HWHB] (citing Mara H. Gottfried &
Sarah Horner, How Often Do Arbitrators Reinstate Fired Cops? Just Under Half the Time,
ST.
PAUL
PIONEER
PRESS
(Minn.)
(June
23,
2019),
https://www.twincities.com/2019/06/23/how-often-do-arbitrators-reinstate-fired-cops-justunder-half-the-time/ [https://perma.cc/P646-L876]).
2

3

Id.
How George Floyd Died, and What Happened Next, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2021),

https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd.html [https://perma.cc/2FBT-MD2Z].
4

5

6

7

Id.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part II.
See League Calls on Legislature to Keep Working on Police Arbitration Reform, LEAGUE

MINN. CITIES (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.lmc.org/news-publications/news/all/policearbitration-reform/ [https://perma.cc/E46Z-V3XC]; MINN. STAT. § 179A.20, subdiv. 4
(2021).
MINN. STAT. § 179A.20, subdiv. 4.
Jon Collins, Half of Fired Minnesota Police Officers Get Their Jobs Back Through
Arbitration,
MPR
NEWS
(July
9,
2020,
5:00
PM),
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2020/07/09/half-of-fired-minnesota-police-officers-get-theirjobs-back-through-arbitration [https://perma.cc/G7ZJ-9W6S].
OF

8

9
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Grievance arbitrations created an “immunity” culture within police
departments and made it difficult for police chiefs to change police
department cultures across the state. 10 There is a clear conflict between the
motivation and interests held by a city’s mayor and police chief, and those
held by the police union leaders. 11 This Article will explore police grievance
arbitration practices in Minnesota and whether the Police Accountability
Act 12 (“PAA”) will likely make a difference in arbitrations going forward. 13
II.

HISTORY

A. Grievance Arbitration
Police officers are public employees covered under the Minnesota
Public Employment Labor Relations Act (“MNPELRA”), which governs
public-sector collective bargaining in Minnesota. 14 The police union
negotiates with the public employer, usually the city, to establish the
collective bargaining agreement that will govern that department’s police
officers. 15 Disciplinary procedures and grievance procedures are some
mandatory topics of such negotiations. 16 Under MNPELRA, all contracts
must include a grievance procedure providing compulsory binding
arbitration for grievances arising from written discipline. 17 If parties do not
agree on the collective bargaining agreement’s terms, the parties proceed to

10

11

See infra notes 238–245 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.

The PAA was passed by the Minnesota Legislature in June 2020 to try and remedy the
police grievance arbitration procedure and will be discussed more in depth later in this
article. See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
MINN. STAT. § 179A.03 (2021). MNPERLA, the primary law governing public sector
collective bargaining in Minnesota, promotes orderly and constructive relationships between
all public employers and their employees. MINN. STAT. § 179A.01 (2021). The importance
or necessity of some services to the public can create imbalances in the relative bargaining
power between public employees and employers. Id. As a result, unique approaches to
negotiations and resolutions of disputes between public employees and employers are
necessary. Id.
See MINN. STAT. § 179A.01.
LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, HUMAN RESOURCES REFERENCE MANUAL, CH. 6 LABOR
RELATIONS
54
(Sept.
7,
2021),
https://www.lmc.org/wpcontent/uploads/documents/HRRM-Labor-Relations.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AD8-V7HK].
The League of Minnesota Cities put together a chapter on Labor Relations for Minnesota
Cities, and it included a chapter about Human Resources discussing collective bargaining
agreement negotiations and disciplinary and grievance procedures. See id.
MINN. STAT. § 179A.20, subdiv. 4.
12

13

14

15

16

17
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mediation. 18 If, after mediation, the parties still do not have an agreement,
the parties proceed to binding interest arbitration. 19
Whether, and how, the city is able to discipline employees is a key
provision in a collective bargaining agreement. 20 Cities may not negotiate a
provision into a collective bargaining agreement that exempts certain forms
of written discipline from the grievance procedure for non-probationary
employees. 21 However, the collective bargaining agreement typically
includes a provision that prohibits probationary employees from contesting
written discipline or discharge through the grievance procedure. 22 “The
primary focus in discipline policies relates to when discipline may be
imposed and what process should surround investigations that may lead to
discipline, communicating the discipline decision, and appealing the
discipline decision.” 23 Arbitrators look to the exact language of the provision
during the grievance arbitration. 24 Additionally, the arbitrator decides
whether the city consistently applies the policy. 25 Disciplinary provisions
include language that state an employer may only discipline or discharge an
employee for “just cause.” 26 However, collective bargaining agreements
usually do not define “just cause.” 27

B. What Is Just Cause?
The definition of “just cause” is typically the main discussion of
discipline grievance arbitrations. 28 Not every potential offense an employee
18

Id.

MINN. STAT. § 179A.15 (2021); MINN. STAT. § 179A.16, subdiv. 2 (2021). “Binding
interest arbitration resolves disputes over terms and conditions of employment that have not
been resolved by substantial, good faith bargaining efforts.” See LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES,
supra note 16.
LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, supra note 16, at 97.
19

20

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 97–98. Arbitration is a “creature of contract.” See Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration:
Creature of Contract, Pillar of Procedure, 8 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 2 (2016).
LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, supra note 16, at 96–97.
Id. at 97–98.
21

22

23

24

25

26

Mario F. Bognanno, Jonathan E. Booth, Thomas J. Norman, Laura J. Cooper & Stephen
F. Befort, The Conventional Wisdom of Discharge Arbitration Outcomes and Remedies:
Fact or Fiction, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 153, 157 (2014) (citing Enterprise Wheel
Co., 46 LA 359 (1966) (Daugherty, Arb.)); see also LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, supra note
16, at 97.
LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, supra note 16, at 97–98. Grievance procedures most often deal
with two primary areas: (1) disputes or disagreements about whether a city violated the union
27

28
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may commit can be listed in the collective bargaining agreement. 29 The
provisions within the collective bargaining agreement include a broad
definition for when an employee may be disciplined or discharged. 30
“Cause” or just cause is commonly used language in collective bargaining
agreements to describe circumstances where an employee may be
disciplined or discharged. 31 When just cause is not explicitly defined, the
arbitrator has the authority to determine what is, or is not, “just cause.” 32
In 1966, Carroll Daugherty created a commonly known definition of
just cause: The Seven Tests of Just Cause (“Seven Tests”). 33 Daugherty’s
Seven Tests are posed as seven questions where answering “no” to any one
question usually signifies that just and proper cause does not exist. 34
Daugherty’s seven questions are:
1. Was the grievant forewarned of the consequences for violating
the rule/order?
2. Was the rule/order germane to the orderly, efficient, and safe
operation of the business?
3. Was the alleged rule/order violation investigated prior to
issuing discipline?
4. Was the employer’s investigation conducted fairly and
objectively?
5. Did the investigating “judge” find substantial evidence of
employee guilt, as charged?
6. Does the employer apply its rule/penalties evenhandedly and
without discrimination?
7. Was the level of meted out discipline reasonably related to the
seriousness of the employee’s proven offense and to the record
of the employee’s service? 35

contract that involves contract interpretation, or (2) whether a city violated the union contract
when it disciplined an employee that involves both the application of fact and the discipline
standard. See id. at 105. The second type of grievance is commonly referred to as a discipline
grievance. See id. at 106.
See id. at 97.
29

30

31

32

33

34

Id.
Id.
Id.
Bognanno, et al., supra note 27.
Id. at 157–58 (citing Grief Bros. Cooperage Corp., 42 LA 555, 557–59 (1964) (Daugherty,

Arb.)).
Id. at 158. This study examined the arbitration community’s commonly accepted beliefs
about arbitration outcomes and remedies in employee discharge cases. Id. at 185. The
findings revealed some beliefs are likely fact, while others are fiction. Id. The data in this
study was from 1,432 Minnesota discharge awards and seventy-four arbitrators who decided
them. Id. at 153.
35
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Daugherty’s definition is widely used in materials designed for training
arbitrators and labor advocates. 36 However, a study reviewing published
arbitration awards in Minnesota found that Daugherty’s test may not be as
widely used by arbitrators as people once thought. 37 The study found that,
in Minnesota, Daugherty’s Seven Tests are not as “undeniably influential”
or as widely accepted in arbitral just cause decision-making as the literature
has indicated. 38 The findings revealed that only 7.5% of the discharge awards
issued per arbitrator explicitly utilized Daugherty’s criteria. 39 The study’s
finding was surprising because Daugherty’s Seven Tests are widely known
and included in arbitration trainings; however, arbitrators may not explicitly
state they are using Daugherty’s Seven Tests in their awards. 40 Because
arbitrator training discusses Daugherty’s tests so thoroughly, arbitrators may
habitually apply the tests without walking through the exact analysis to get to
their conclusion. 41
The Minnesota Supreme Court has weighed in on the definition of just
cause. 42 The court said “cause” must specifically relate to and affect the
administration of the office, and it must be restricted to something of a
substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public. 43
An attempt to remove an officer for any cause not affecting their
competency or fitness would be an excess of power and equivalent to an
arbitrary removal. 44 Without statutory specification, the sufficiency of the
cause should be determined with reference to the character of the office,
and the qualifications necessary to fill it. 45 The cause or reason for dismissal
must relate to the way the employee performs their duties, and the evidence

36

Id. at 157 (citing JOHN E. DUNSFORD, ARBITRAL DECISIONS: THE TESTS OF JUST CAUSE,

ARBITRATION 1989: THE ARBITRATOR'S DISCRETION DURING AND AFTER THE
HEARING, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SECOND ANNUAL MEETINGS OF THE NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 23–50 (G. W. Gruenberg, ed., 1990)).
Id. at 174.
Id. at 181.

IN

37

38

39

40

41

Id.
See id.
See id.

42

Hagen v. Civ. Serv. Bd., 282 Minn. 296, 164 N.W.2d 629 (1969).

43

Id. at 299, 164 N.W.2d at 631–32 (citation omitted). The court decided whether there was

just cause for dismissal where the employee, who was a psychiatric technician at a state
hospital, was dismissed for sleeping while on duty. Id. at 299, 164 N.W.2d at 632. The
employee had been suspended on two previous occasions for sleeping while on duty. Id. at
297, 164 N.W.2d at 631. The court found that under the definition of “just cause,” the
evidence substantially showed that the dismissal related to the way the employee performed
their duties. Id. at 299, 164 N.W.2d at 632.
Id. at 299, 164 N.W.2d at 632.
44

45

Id.
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showing the existence of reasons for dismissal must be substantial. 46
Where the collective bargaining agreement does not specifically define
just cause or limit the available remedies, the arbitrator is free to adopt a
reasonable definition and craft a remedy that does not conflict with the
terms of the agreement. 47 What may be considered just cause to discipline
an employee might not be just cause to discharge an employee. 48 The
Minnesota Supreme Court held, “[T]he power to fashion a remedy is a
necessary part of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction unless withdrawn from [them]
by specific contractual language between the parties or by a written
submission of issues which precludes the fashioning of a remedy.” 49

C. Minnesota Arbitration Awards
In Minnesota arbitration proceedings arising under collective
bargaining agreements, a final disposition occurs at the conclusion of the
arbitration proceedings, or upon the failure of the employee to elect
arbitration within the time provided by the collective bargaining agreement. 50
A disciplinary action does not become public data if an arbitrator sustains a
grievance and reverses all aspects of any disciplinary action. 51 Arbitration
awards are issued by arbitrators on the Bureau of Mediation Services’
(“BMS”) Arbitration Roster and are available to download for free on the
BMS website. 52

1. City of Duluth and Duluth Police Union, Local No. 807 53
This arbitration arose from the termination of Duluth police officer,
Adam Huot, by the City of Duluth Police Department. 54 Huot was a police

46

Id.

State Off. of State Auditor v. Minn. Ass’n of Pro. Emps., 504 N.W.2d 751, 755 (Minn.
1993).
See City of Bloomington v. Local 2828 of Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., 290
N.W.2d 598, 602 (Minn. 1980); State Auditor, 504 N.W.2d at 757–58 (recognizing that
while employee's conduct would have been sufficient grounds for discharge, the arbitrator,
in the absence of any language to the contrary, was free to determine that such conduct was
only grounds for disciplining the employee).
City of Bloomington, 290 N.W.2d at 603.
MINN. STAT. § 13.43, subdiv. 2(b) (2021); MINN. STAT. § 179A.04, subdiv. 3 (2021).
MINN. STAT. § 13.43, subdiv. 2(b).
Arbitration
Awards,
BUREAU
OF
MEDIATION
SERVS.,
https://mn.gov/bms/arbitration/awards/ [https://perma.cc/8ENT-FD3E].
City of Duluth v. Duluth Police Union, Local No. 807, BMS #18-PA-0250 (2018)
(Bognanno, Arb.), https://mn.gov/bms/documents/BMS/134813-20180622-Duluth.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SB8X-BVAE].
Id. at 1.
47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54
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officer in Duluth for nine years and was terminated in June 2017. 55 Because
the incident that led to Huot’s termination was recorded by several body
cameras, the facts were largely not contested. 56 Huot and two other officers,
including a rookie in training, responded to a welfare check call concerning
two individuals who were known alcoholics. 57 The officers awakened the
individuals who were either “sleeping” or “passed out,” then directed them
to move along and, without incident, the two individuals left the scene. 58
Later that same evening, the officers were sent on another call where they
found those same individuals trespassing on private property. 59
At the second call, Huot and the two other officers encountered the
individuals in a parking ramp and advised the individuals they would receive
trespassing citations in the mail. 60 One of the individuals became provocative
and, after a verbal exchange, stated he wanted “to go to jail right . . . now!” 61
The individual was handcuffed with his hands behind his back. 62 The
handcuffed individual walked with the officers until he fell to the ground
and said, “I ain’t gonna to make it easy for you guys.” 63 Then, Huot grabbed
the individual by the handcuffs and dragged the individual one-hundred
feet down the corridor. 64 Huot disregarded comments from the other
officers to pick up the individual. 65 As Huot walked through a doorway while
dragging the individual, the individual’s head hit the metal door frame. 66 The
individual was brought to the hospital to be examined. 67 The individual
sustained no major injuries. 68
Following this incident, the Chief of Police terminated Huot, citing a
use of force violation. 69 The collective bargaining agreement provided that
any employee who has completed their initial probationary period may be
suspended without pay, discharged, or disciplined only for just cause. 70
Additionally, it said discipline shall be corrective and progressive, except for
cases of serious offense, any suspensions, demotions, or removal action
55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

Id.
Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
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shall be preceded by a written warning. 71 Huot initiated a grievance
according to the collective bargaining agreement, which ended up in
arbitration. 72
The arbitrator used Daugherty’s Seven Tests to decide whether the
City of Duluth had just cause to discharge Huot. 73 The arbitrator found
Huot’s termination was not for just cause and reinstated Huot without back
pay and benefits. 74 The arbitrator stated the unreasonable use of force was
serious “even though the amount of the needless discomfort inflicted on
[the individual] was nominal.” 75 Additionally, the arbitrator decided the use
of force was “minor compared to relatively major misuses of force.” 76 The
arbitrator then said, “In this day and age, such conduct can evoke public
tumult, which is a major concern to the public employer and rightly so.” 77
However, the arbitrator concluded that termination was too harsh for a longserving police officer who was otherwise considered a “good” police
officer. 78
Even though the arbitrator considered Huot a “good” officer, Huot
was coached previously for incidents that ultimately did not rise to the level
of discipline. 79 The arbitrator decided the collective bargaining agreement’s
progressive discipline provision warranted a loss of back pay but did not yet
warrant termination. 80 Because Huot was reinstated without back pay, if
Huot offended again, termination would be the appropriate next level of
discipline. 81
This award is an example of arbitrators’ broad use of authority. Duluth
Mayor Emily Larson supported the decision to fire Huot, saying that “the
power and authority of [Duluth] officers . . . comes from a foundation of

71

72

73

Id.
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 42. See Enter. Wire Co. v. Enter. Indep. Union, 46 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 359

(1966) (Daugherty, Arb.) (establishing a seven-pronged test to determine whether just cause
exists where no contractual definition for just cause was given). In City of Duluth, the
arbitrator addressed (1) notice, (2) reasonableness, (3) complete and (4) fair investigation, (5)
proof, (6) equal treatment, and (7) penalty—each individually. BMS #18-PA-0250, at 42–51.
City of Duluth, BMS #18-PA-0250, at 53.
Id. at 51.
74

75

76

77

78

79

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 51–52. Huot received departmental coaching for the two prior incidents. Id. The

arbitrator referred to the coaching as a “heads up” for Huot, which Huot missed because it
was not long after a previous incident that the present incident occurred. Id. at 52.
Id.

80

81

Id.
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strong community relationships.” 82 Common sense dictates that dragging an
intoxicated individual does not support a foundation of community
relationship with police officers. 83
Because the collective bargaining agreement has a progressive
discipline provision and the broad just cause provision, the arbitrator had
the authority to reinstate Huot. 84 However, a police officer, no matter how
long they have been on the force, should not be given their job back if they
have a severe lapse in judgment. 85 Here, Huot made the choice to give in to
his emotions and drag an individual by the handcuffs, which showed a
complete disregard for the individual’s physical safety and human dignity. 86
However, the award could have been harsher had the arbitrator chosen to
reinstate with back pay; there is still a level of discipline here because the
arbitrator is acknowledging Huot's improper conduct. 87 Reinstating without
back pay created an unpaid suspension for the duration of the grievance
procedure, which ended up being over a year. 88

Chris Graves, Duluth Police Chief: Cop Who Dragged Handcuffed Man Should Be Fired,
MPR NEWS (June 29, 2018, 6:30 PM), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2018/06/29/duluthpolice-officer-fired-for-dragging-handcuffed-man-through-skywalk-last-year
[https://perma.cc/5Z4B-KP4A]. Due to the prevalence of social media, the video of Huot
dragging the intoxicated individual through the corridor of the Duluth Skywalk spread widely.
82

Id.
See id.
See Lee Kraftchick, How Hard Is It to Fire a Police Officer?: A Look at One Local
Government’s Experience and Some Possibilities for Reform, 50 STETSON L. REV. 491,
83

84

493–94 (2021) (noting how collective bargaining power, just cause provisions, and other
facets result in arbitrators ruling on suspensions and firings).
See, e.g., Haven Orecchio-Egresitz, The Houston Police Chief Called It 'Inexplicable' that
85

4 of His Officers Fired 21 Shots at an Incapacitated Man During a Mental Health Call.
They've Been Fired, INSIDER (Sept. 11, 2020, 1:03 PM), https://www.insider.com/houstonpolice-department-fired-4-officers-who-shot-nicolas-chavez-2020-9 [https://perma.cc/7ZMKF85R]. Here, four Houston police officers were terminated because they shot twenty-sevenyear-old Nicholas Chavez (now deceased) twenty-one times while Chavez was on the ground
and twenty-eight other police officers were on the scene. Id.
See Graves, supra note 82.
See City of Duluth v. Duluth Police Union, Local No. 807, BMS #18-PA-0250 (2018)
(Bognanno, Arb.), https://mn.gov/bms/documents/BMS/134813-20180622-Duluth.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SB8X-BVAE].
The award is dated June 22, 2018, and Huot was discharged on June 5, 2017. Id. at 1.
86

87

88
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2. City of Sauk Rapids, Minnesota and Law Enforcement Labor Services,
Inc. 89
This arbitration arose from the termination of police officer Eric
Norsten by the City of Sauk Rapids, Minnesota Police Department in
December 2016. 90 Norsten was an officer with the City of Sauk Rapids since
2000, and a police officer for approximately twenty-five years. 91 The City of
Sauk Rapids provided three bases for terminating Norsten: (1) citizen
complaint of unnecessary tasing by Norsten at a grocery store; (2) six
different dates on which Norsten admittedly left the city limits for home in
his squad car without department permission; and (3) a charge of improper
use of force in which Norsten tased a female whom he had taken into
custody after responding to a mental health call. 92 The arbitrator’s analysis
and decision primarily focused on the latter incident—a charge of improper
use of force. 93
The tasing incident from the mental health call occurred around 10:00
p.m. when Norsten and his supervisor, Sergeant Bukowski, reported to a
call about an intoxicated, disturbed female. 94 When the officers arrived at
the scene, they found the caller (the woman’s husband) and an older woman
“trying to verbally control the [w]oman, who was physically lashing out,
running around in the grass, and making guttural noises along with using
profanity.” 95 The woman struck the officers as they were trying to get her
into the squad car. 96 Once the officers were able to corral her, the officers
handcuffed her hands behind her back. 97 She was seat-belted in the back of
the squad car, despite her almost non-stop kicking and screaming. 98
Norsten transported the woman in his squad car to the hospital located
in St. Cloud, Minnesota. 99 During the ride, the woman disengaged the seat
belt and began moving around the back seat, kicking the squad car windows
as well as the cage behind Norsten; she kicked so forcefully that the cage

City of Sauk Rapids, Minn. v. Law Enf’t Labor Servs., Inc., BMS Case #17-PA-0475 (June
2, 2017) (Tidwell, Arb.), https://mn.gov/bms/documents/BMS/130647-20170602SaukRapids.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9ZX-L467].
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 3.
89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and the back of the front seat could be seen moving in the squad camera
recording. 100 Once Norsten arrived at the hospital with the woman, multiple
hospital staff got the woman onto a bed where her legs and arms were in
restraints. 101 The woman remained agitated and was spitting at hospital
staff. 102 It was at this point that Norsten tased the woman to get her to comply
with hospital staff while the doctor ordered medication to calm the woman
down. 103
Norsten testified that “he believed the woman to be a danger to herself
or others.” 104 The arbitrator acknowledged that Norsten feared for the
woman’s ability to inflict bodily harm to herself or another person. 105
However, the arbitrator concluded this fear was not reasonable given the
number of hospital staff in the room and the fact that they were clustered
near the woman’s upper body. 106 Moreover, her ability to move was
restricted due to the restraints. 107
The arbitrator noted that others in the room recalled Norsten and the
woman yelling at each other, both using profanity, and concluded that
Norsten’s tasing may have been motivated by “a predictable albeit
problematic frustration given the totality of his interaction” with the
woman. 108 The arbitrator also noted that on the night of the incident, there
was no testimony from hospital staff expressing concern about Norsten’s
actions. 109 Only one staff member indicated concern, days later, when
questioned in the course of the St. Cloud police investigation. 110 The
arbitrator found Norsten violated the policy on tasing a person in restraints
but also determined it was a “close call.” 111
The discipline provision of the collective bargaining agreement states
that the City of Sauk Rapids “will discipline employees for just cause only.” 112
Discharge will be preceded by a five-day suspension without pay. 113 The
arbitrator reinstated Norsten with back pay and reduced discipline to a two100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

109

110

111

Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13–14. The policy regarding the use of a taser on restrained individuals at issue states,

“The taser shall not be used on restrained individuals unless the actions of the subject pose
a potential threat of bodily harm to themselves or to any other person.” Id. at 7 n.13.
Id. at 4.
112

113

Id.
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day suspension without pay. 114 Additionally, the discipline for Norsten
leaving the city while on duty without permission was converted to a written
reprimand. 115
This award was alarming because Norsten tased an already restrained,
mentally ill woman, and Norsten was reinstated because the arbitrator
thought it was “a close call.” 116 A police officer is trained to perform in an
abundance of “close call” situations. 117 A trained, seasoned police officer
should not give in to frustration while standing around with a group of
clinicians that are trying to care for someone. 118 A police officer is supposed
to protect individuals in the community during, what is likely, their worst
hour. Sometimes police officers use a taser; however, because the woman
was already in four-point restraints and there were other people in the room
to support the officers, using a taser was inappropriate in this situation—no
matter how close the call. 119
For Norsten, who had been on the force for a long time, the number
of years on the force should be a mitigating factor as a matter of law for
determining appropriate discipline. 120 A seasoned police officer should be
held to a higher standard. Senior partners in a law firm are held to a higher
standard than the associates below them, 121 just as a surgical resident is held
to a higher standard than a surgical intern; 122a higher level of care and
114

115

116

117

118

Id. at 18.
Id.
See id. at 14.
See MINN. STAT. § 626.8469 (2021); see also MINN. STAT. § 626.8455 (2021).
See City of Sauk Rapids, Minn. v. Law Enf’t Labor Servs., Inc., BMS Case #17-PA-0475,

4 (2017) (Tidwell, Arb.), https://mn.gov/bms/documents/BMS/130647-20170602SaukRapids.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9ZX-L467] (noting relevant contract, policy, and
procedure provisions, specifically Policy P-06, regarding restricted taser uses).
See id. Additionally, active full-time and part-time peace officers in Minnesota are
statutorily required to complete a minimum of forty-eight hours of continuing education
training in four topics every three-year license renewal cycle. MINN. STAT. § 626.8469.
Officers with a renewal date after June 30, 2022, must include a minimum of six hours for
Crisis Intervention and Mental Illness Crisis. Id. The course must include scenario-based
instruction and cover techniques for relating to individuals with mental illnesses. Id. Active
officers are mandated to train annually in use of force. MINN. STAT. § 626.8452 (2021).
See City of Sauk Rapids, Minn., BMS Case #17-PA-0475 at 3 (“Grievant had been a police
officer for a total of approximately 25 years and an employee of the City in that capacity for
approximately 16 years.”). But see id. at 7–14 (mitigating factors did not include Grievant’s
time as a police officer).
See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
See e.g., Keith A. Braswell, Residents and Interns Subject Medical Malpractice Liability,
67 OHIO JUR. 3D MALPRACTICE § 46 (Aug. 2021) (stating that under some authorities, the
standard of care for a resident is that of a similarly situated and educated resident, rather than
that of a practicing physician).
119

120

121
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responsibilities come with time in any role. 123 A police officer who has been
on the force for upwards of twenty-five years should know better than to give
in to his personal frustration and use unnecessary force because someone
may be mentally unwell. 124

D. Public Policy Exception
The courts created the public policy exception as a narrow exception
to the contracts doctrine, allowing courts to abrogate private contracts that
are contrary to public policy. 125 In limited circumstances, a public policy
exception may provide a basis for courts to vacate an arbitration award. 126
Minnesota appellate courts addressed the public policy exception in State,

Office of State Auditor v. Minnesota Association of Professional
Employees.
127

Courts may set aside an arbitration award on public policy grounds
“only if: (1) the collective bargaining agreement contains terms which violate
public policy, or (2) the arbitration award creates an explicit conflict with
other ‘laws and legal precedents.’” 128 In deciding whether an arbitration
award violates public policy, the court does not look to the grievant’s
conduct, but to whether enforcement of the arbitration award violates some
well-defined and dominant public policy. 129
See supra text accompanying notes 121–22.
See e.g., Eugene A. Paoline, III & William Terrill, Police Education, Experience, and the
Use of Force, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 179, 187–88 (2007) (finding that use of force is used
least frequently in encounters involving officers with the most experience); see also MINN.
123

124

ADMIN. R. § 6700.0900 (continuing education requirements indicative of a police officer’s
trained better judgment).
United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42–43 (1987).
State Off. of State Auditor v. Minn. Ass’n of Pro. Emps., 504 N.W.2d 751, 756 (Minn.
1993).
State Off. of State Auditor v. Minn. Ass’n of Pro. Emps., 493 N.W.2d 591 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992); State Auditor, 504 N.W.2d 751. This case arose out of a grievance filed by the
Minnesota Association of Professional Employees on behalf of a local government auditor
who had been discharged by the State Auditor “for falsifying expense reports and for being
untruthful during an investigation into that misconduct.” State Auditor, 504 N.W.2d at 752.
The arbitrator ordered the auditor to be reinstated with back pay and the State moved to
vacate the award under the public policy exception. Id. at 754. The district court granted the
State’s motion, vacating the award because the award either violated the public policy
contained in the agreement or explicitly conflicted with a well-defined and dominant public
policy. Id. The court of appeals reversed the district court and held that the arbitrator’s award
did not conflict with public policy. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court found that the
arbitrator’s award did not violate any well-defined and dominant public policy. Id.
Id. at 756.
125

126

127

128

129

Id.
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The courts use a two-step process to evaluate whether an arbitrator's
award violates public policy. First, courts determine whether the party
challenging the award identified a public policy that is “well-defined and
dominant” based on “laws and legal precedents.” 130 Second, if the party
identified a policy that meets those standards, the court examines whether
the award itself is contrary to the policy. 131
In evaluating whether a public policy is well-defined and dominant, a
court must look to “existing laws and legal precedents” and cannot rely on
“‘general considerations of supposed public interests’ . . . to overturn the
arbitrator’s award.” 132 “Although the public employee’s conduct may have
violated a well-defined and dominant public policy, it is another matter to
‘conclude that the arbitrator’s award reinstating [the employee] violates’ a
well-defined and dominant public policy.” 133 Although a court may have a
“strong disagreement” with an arbitrator’s award, this is not “sufficient
grounds for vacating the arbitrator’s award.”” 134
The public policy may be very well-defined and dominant, but if the
arbitrator’s award does not violate the public policy, then the courts will not
vacate the award. 135 One issue is the provisions within the collective
bargaining agreement. 136 Broadly written provisions give the arbitrator
authority to define just cause for termination and to determine the
appropriate discipline for violating department policies. 137 This broad
authority for the arbitrator limits the court’s ability to vacate the arbitrator’s
award. 138

E. Minnesota Supreme Court
Generally, vacating an arbitration award is rare, and police grievance
arbitrations are no different. 139 Cities may move to vacate arbitration awards
See Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 43–44 (quotation omitted) (refusing to vacate an arbitrator’s
award because the public policy advanced by the challenger failed to meet that standard).
State Auditor, 504 N.W.2d at 758 (refusing to vacate an arbitrator's award because the
award was not contrary to the well-defined and dominant public policy that was identified).
City of Richfield v. Law Enf’t Labor Servs., 923 N.W.2d 36, 41 (Minn. 2019) (citing State
Auditor, 504 N.W.2d at 756).
Id. (quoting State Auditor, 504 N.W.2d at 757).
Id. at 42 (quoting State Auditor, 504 N.W.2d at 758).
130

131

132

133

134

135

Id.

Jim Hilbert, Improving Police Officer Accountability in Minnesota: Three Proposed
Legislative Reforms, 47 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 222, 267 n.253 (2021).
Stephen Rushin, Police Arbitration, 74 VAND. L. REV. 1023, 1042 (2021).

136

137

138

Id.

Joseph L. Daly, Vacating Arbitration Awards,
https://www.minncle.org/eaccess/1213491701/0721_315pm_Daly.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7BVY-VPE8].
139

See
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based on an argument that the award violates public policy. 140 The
Minnesota Supreme Court has yet to vacate an arbitration award from labor
arbitration based on the very narrow public policy exception. 141 This
limitation has created a nearly impossible environment for cities and the
state to ensure their disciplinary decisions are upheld. 142
The Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act lays out the narrow rules for
judicial vacation of arbitration awards; however, public policy is not one of
the enumerated rules. 143 The statute states in part, upon application of a
party, the court shall vacate an award where:
• “The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue
means;” 144
• There was “evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a
neutral,” 145 corruption by any of the arbitrators, 146 or misconduct
prejudicing any party’s rights; 147
• The arbitrators exceeded their powers; 148
• The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing after showing
sufficient cause, “refused to consider evidence material to the
controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to
section 572B.15” 149, thereby substantially prejudicing the party’s
rights; 150
• There was no arbitration agreement; 151 or
• The arbitration was conducted without proper notice, thereby
substantially prejudicing the party’s rights. 152
140

141

See City of Richfield v. Law Enf’t Labor Servs., 923 N.W.2d 36, 40 (Minn. 2019).
See id. at 41 (reversing the lower court’s decision to vacate an arbitration award under the

public policy exception; citing State Off. of State Auditor v. Minn. Ass'n of Pro. Emps., 504
N.W.2d 751, 758 (Minn. 1993), the only other case where the Minnesota Supreme Court
was asked, and similarly declined, to vacate an arbitration award under the public policy
exception).
Id. (stating that even though the “public employee’s conduct may have violated a welldefined and dominant public policy, it is another matter to conclude that the arbitrator’s
award reinstating [the employee] violates a well-defined and dominant public policy”)
(internal quotations omitted).
MINN. STAT. § 572B.23(a) (2021).
MINN. STAT. § 572B.23(a)(1).
MINN. STAT. § 572B.23(a)(2)(A).
MINN. STAT. § 572B.23(a)(2)(B).
MINN. STAT. § 572B.23(a)(2)(C).
MINN. STAT. § 572B.23(a)(4).
This section articulates the arbitration process in Minnesota. MINN. STAT. § 572B.15
(2021).
MINN. STAT. § 572B.23(a)(3).
MINN. STAT. § 572B.23(a)(5).
MINN. STAT. § 572B.23 (a)(6).
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The U.S. Supreme Court identified an exception to the general
principle against substantive review of an arbitrator's decision: the public
policy exception. 153 The public policy exception is based on the principle
that, “[a]s with any contract, . . . a court may not enforce a collective
bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy.” 154 But the public
policy “must be well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained ‘by
reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general
considerations of supposed public interests.’” 155 Further, the award itself
must create an “explicit conflict” with that public policy to justify application
of the exception. 156
The most recent case heard by the Minnesota Supreme Court arising
from a police grievance arbitration was City of Richfield v. Law Enforcement
Labor Services, Inc. 157 In this case, a City of Richfield police officer, Nathan
Kinsey, was discharged for failing to report use of force and violating other
policies. 158 Kinsey, through his union, Law Enforcement Labor Services
Inc., filed a grievance resulting in arbitration. 159 The arbitrator found that
because Kinsey did not use excessive force and his decision not to report
the use of force was a “lapse in judgement,” the city did not have just cause
to discharge Kinsey. 160 The arbitrator ordered reinstatement with back pay
and imposed a three-shift unpaid suspension as discipline. 161 The city moved
for the district court to vacate the award on public policy grounds. 162 The
district court denied the city’s motion and upheld the arbitration award. 163
The district court concluded that no public policy would be violated if
Kinsey were reinstated. 164 The city appealed the district court’s decision. 165
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s ruling. 166
The appellate court held that the enforcement of the arbitration award
would violate well-defined and dominant public policies against excessive
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum &
Plastic Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983).
Id.
Id. (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)).
United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987).
See City of Richfield v. Law Enf’t Labor Servs., 923 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 2019).
Id. at 38.
153

154

155

156

157

158

159

160

161

162

163

164

165

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. See City of Richfield v. Law Enf’t Labor Servs., Inc., 910 N.W.2d 465 (Minn. Ct. App.

2018).
166

City of Richfield, 910 N.W.2d at 477.
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force. 167 Additionally, the court held the award interfered with policies that
favor transparency and proper reporting of the use of force and require
police departments to hold police officers accountable for their conduct. 168
The union appealed, and the Minnesota Supreme Court granted further
review. 169
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s
decision, holding that enforcing the arbitration award did not violate a welldefined and dominant public policy. 170 The supreme court held that
arbitrators serve as the “final judge of both law and fact, including the
interpretation of the terms of any contract.” 171 The court acknowledged that
the public policy exception is narrow and “was created by courts as an
extension of the contract doctrine allowing courts to abrogate private
contracts that are contrary to public policy.” 172 A “public-policy exception
may, in limited circumstances, provide a basis to vacate an arbitration award
that violates a well-defined and dominant public policy.” 173
To determine “whether a public policy is well-defined and dominant,
a court must look to ‘existing laws and legal precedents’ and cannot rely on
‘general considerations of supposed public interests . . . to overturn the
arbitrator’s award.’” 174 The court emphasized that the analysis should not
focus on whether an employee’s conduct was contrary to public policy, but
on whether the award is contrary to public policy. 175 The court concluded
that even though Kinsey’s actions may have been disturbing, a “strong
disagreement with an arbitrator’s result does not provide sufficient grounds
for vacating the arbitrator’s award.” 176
The Minnesota Supreme Court has made it clear that it will not vacate
an arbitration award based on the public policy exception merely because
the court disagrees with the arbitrator’s decision. 177 The court has not
accepted a public policy exception argument on behalf of the city or state,
and the court has refused to opine on the application of the public policy

167

168

Id.
Id.

169

City of Richfield v. Law Enf’t Labor Servs., Inc., 923 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 2019).

170

Id. at 39.
Id. at 40 (quoting State Off. of State Auditor v. Minn. Ass’n of Pro. Emps., 504 N.W.2d

171

751, 754 (Minn. 1993)).
Id. (referencing United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42–43
(1987)).
Id. (citing State Auditor, 504 N.W.2d at 756).
Id. at 40–41 (quoting State Auditor, 504 N.W.2d at 756). See supra text accompanying
note 128 (addressing when a court may set aside an arbitration award).
172

173

174

175

176

177

Id.
Id. (quoting State Auditor, 504 N.W.2d at 758).
See id.
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analysis to sets of facts beyond the case in front of them. 178
To open the door for the opportunity to succeed in court, the
collective bargaining agreement provisions would need to change. 179 Because
grievance procedures are statutorily required, cities are unable to remove
the procedures completely, so cities will have to work within the provisions
of the statute to effectuate change. 180 Many reforms have been proposed,
including management improvements surrounding the agency’s
investigation or failure to comply with procedural requirements mandated
in the collective bargaining agreement. 181 Making management
improvements alone is inadequate because it does not eliminate the
arbitrator’s broad authority to reverse decisions based on missteps the
arbitrator deems unacceptable or unjust, but that a court or other arbitrators
may find innocuous. 182 The broad authority awarded to arbitrators paired
with the arbitrator selection process leaves the employer without clear
precedent and, depending on the arbitrator selected, without recourse
against police officers.
III.

THE PROBLEM

A. Minnesota Police Departments
Minneapolis Police Department’s Chief of Police, Medaria
Arradondo, was appointed to be MPD’s fifty-third chief in 2017. 183 When
he was a lieutenant, Chief Arradondo joined a lawsuit that portrayed the
MPD as a “cauldron of racist behavior,” and he has struggled to overhaul
the department. 184 Black people account for about twenty percent of the
Id. at 41 n.1 (citing State Auditor, 504 N.W.2d at 758 n.9).
See Hilbert, supra note 136.
See Kraftchick, supra note 84, at 493–95. “Civil service protections for public employees
date back to the late 1800s.” Id. “Collective bargaining for state employees, including police,
dates [back] to the 1960s.” Id. These longstanding job protections make it unrealistic, if not
impossible, to make police officers suddenly subject to discipline without cause. Id.
Id. at 528. Management improvements refer to the investigations and preparation for
arbitrations completed by management. Id.
Id. at 528–29.
Matt Furber, John Eligon & Audra D.S. Burch, Minneapolis Police, Long Accused of
Racism, Face Wrath of Wounded City, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2020),
178

179

180

181

182

183

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/27/us/minneapolis-police.html [https://perma.cc/SH9FJSHJ]. Police Chief Arradondo retired in mid-January. Amir Vera, Carma Hassan &
Michelle Watson, Minneapolis Police Chief Medaria Arradondo, Whose Tenure Included
George Floyd's Murder, Will Retire in January, CNN (Dec. 6, 2021, 10:02 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/12/06/us/minneapolis-police-chief-retiring/index.html
[https://perma.cc/D96L-LUD3].
Fuber, et al., supra note 183.
184

642

2022]

POLICE GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION

643

city’s population, but Black people accounted for more than sixty percent
of the victims in Minneapolis police shootings from late 2009 through May
2019. 185 Activists have been working to dismantle the MPD for several
years. 186 The MPD is predominantly White, with some officers living in
suburbs of Minneapolis and driving into the city to work, creating a rift
between the police officers and the community. 187 Politicians and activists in
Minneapolis have tried to embrace the language of racial justice but have
mostly failed to put words into action. 188
Minnesota police departments have been reinstating police officers
after termination for decades. For example, “[m]ore than 80 police officers
across Minnesota were fired and fought their discharge in arbitration over
the past 20 years,” with approximately half receiving their jobs back. 189 This
number may be higher because “Minnesota’s public records laws prohibit
releasing any information . . . when arbitrators overturn [a police officer
termination] without imposing any type of discipline.” 190 After firing the four
officers involved in killing George Floyd, Chief Arradondo stated, “There
is nothing more debilitating to a chief . . . than when you have grounds to
terminate an officer for misconduct, and you’re dealing with a third-party
mechanism that allows for that employee to not only be back on your
department, but to be patrolling in your communities.” 191
Under the current system, a police department is not able to
adequately control its workforce because terminating officers is not an
option unless the city is prepared to fight the termination in arbitration. 192
When a new chief of police is appointed and has plans that reflect the will
of the community, the chief may not be able to make good on all their
185

Id.

Adrian Florido, These Are the Minneapolis Activists Leading the Push to Abolish the
MPR
NEWS
(June
26,
2020,
11:57
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/06/26/882001628/these-are-the-minneapolis-activists-leading-thepush-to-abolish-the-police [https://perma.cc/2C8Z-TCZT].
186

Police,

187

188

Id.
Id.

Jennifer Bjorhus, Fired Minnesota Officers Have a Proven Career Saver: Arbitration, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis) (June 21, 2020, 7:41 AM), https://www.startribune.com/minnesotacops-fired-then-rehired/571392702/?refresh=true [https://perma.cc/DX9N-7EC9]. There
were a variety of reasons the eighty officers were terminated. One of them was fired for
decorating a Christmas tree with racist items inside Minneapolis’ fourth precinct in
November 2018 and then was reinstated with a 320-hour suspension. Police Officers’
Federation of Minneapolis v. City of Minneapolis, (2020) (Fogelberg, Arb.),
https://mn.gov/bms-stat/assets/20141108-Minneapolis.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZ95-FQJM].
189

190

191

Id.
Id. Chief Arradondo said at a different press conference on June 10, 2021, that if the

Minnesota Legislature is serious about making changes, it will tackle arbitration.
Bjorhus, supra note 189.
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promises because any discipline or discharge is appealable and may be
overturned by an arbitrator. 193
Chief Arradondo is not the only police chief who feels the impact of
binding arbitration on the task of creating a culture of accountability within
their department. 194 Brad Wise, Police Chief in Coon Rapids, Minnesota,
testified at the Minnesota State Capitol that “there’s nothing worse . . . for
an organization than to lose an arbitration. I think it creates distrust within
the workplace . . . [and] it saps the confidence of a police leader. And it
makes police leaders be reluctant to even let cases go to arbitration for fear
of losing them.” 195
Police accountability can take different forms, but the legislature
should work toward accountability appropriate for police officers that
reflects what is important to the community they serve. 196 There have been
different groups of people who advanced potential solutions to the
accountability problem from dismantling arbitration completely to putting
the grievance proceedings in front of administrative law judges. 197 Both sides
want the same thing: a system that stops killing innocent people at the hands
of police officers. 198 With this goal in mind, the Minnesota Legislature took
a small step to try to make a change to the police grievance arbitration
procedure with the PAA. 199

B. Other Police Departments Nationwide
Minnesota is not unique in having a problem between police chiefs
and the officers in their departments. Nationwide, states and cities are
working to try to reduce the disparity between police officers’ offenses and
Id.
Id.
Id. Coon Rapids is a suburb of Minneapolis, Minnesota. Coon Rapids is roughly twentyfive minutes north of Minneapolis. Distance from Minneapolis, MN to Coon Rapids, MN,

193

194

195

DISTANCE BETWEEN CITIES, https://www.distance-cities.com/distance-minneapolis-mn-tocoon-rapids-mn [https://perma.cc/5XQ8-BRPJ].
See infra Part IV.A.
See Rushin, supra note 137, at 1074 (noting various examples, including those in
Memorandum of Understanding Between the City of Fountain Valley and the Fountain
Valley
Police
Officers’
Association
36–37
(2020)),
https://www.fountainvalley.org/DocumentCenter/View/12231/Police-Officers-Association2020-2021 [https://perma.cc/4HFW-C5NZ]); see also S. 5134, 67th Leg. (Wash. 2021)
(aiming to substitute police grievance arbitration for appeals to a civil service commission or
administrative law judge).
Veteran arbitrator Laura Cooper, a retired University of Minnesota labor law professor,
was cited in a Star Tribune article about the Act. See Bjorhus, supra note 189. Cooper said:
“I want a system that stops killing people unjustly.” Id.
See Police Accountability Act of 2020, H.F. 1, 91st Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Minn. 2020).
196

197

198

199
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the discipline imposed. 200 Police officers, and other public employees, have
the opportunity to grieve discipline and termination.
Across the nation, arbitrators have ordered police departments to
rehire officers deemed unfit for duty by their supervisors. 201 A study
completed in 2021, which analyzed 624 police disciplinary appeals litigated
between 2006 and 2020 from law enforcement agencies across the country,
found that arbitrators on appeal reduced or overturned police discipline in
around fifty-two percent of cases. 202 On average, arbitrators reduced the
length of disciplinary suspensions by approximately forty-nine percent. 203 An
article discussing the study considered “how communities should rethink
the use of arbitration on appeal in police disciplinary cases.” 204
Similar to Minnesota, Oregon’s legislature passed a law that limits
arbitrators’ authority. 205 The Oregon law “requires all communities to
develop disciplinary matrices that establish specified ranges of punishment
for different types of misconduct.” 206 Although this study merged data from
cities across the country, there is a limit to any nationwide study. 207 The terms
of each individual collective bargaining agreement are different and some
collective bargaining agreements make the awards confidential. 208 In
Minnesota and across the country, police officers deserve adequate due
process before serious discipline, but the police departments also have a
need to enforce discipline on officers who use excessive force. 209 The current
approach to police disciplinary appeals is not appropriately balanced
See Kallie Cox & William H. Freivogel, Analysis of Police Misconduct Record Laws in
All 50 States, AP NEWS (May 12, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/business-laws-police200

reform-police-government-and-politics-d1301b789461adc582ac659c3f36c03c
[https://perma.cc/NBP8-RCFG].
Rushin, supra note 137, at 1023.
Id. Rushin’s article conducted an examination of police arbitration across the nation
through a dataset of 624 police disciplinary appeals litigated before arbitrators between 2006
and 2020 from a diverse range of law enforcement agencies. Id. Specific examples within the
article include: Sarasota, Florida, where an officer was “caught on camera allegedly beating a
suspect in custody without justification;” San Antonio, Texas, where an officer “repeatedly
used an offensive racial slur while arresting a Black man;” Broward County, Florida, where
a sheriff’s deputy “allegedly hid during the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School
shooting;” and Washington, D.C., where an officer “allegedly sexually abused a teenager in
his squad car.” Id. at 1028.
Id. at 1061.
Id. at 1033.
201

202

203

204

Id.
Id. at 1034.
Id. at 1050.
Id. In Minnesota this type of confidentiality provision is opposed by the Minnesota
Government Data Practices Act. See MINN. STAT. § 13.43.
Rushin, supra note 137, at 1073–74.

205

206

207

208

209

645

646

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:2

between the competing values. 210
The citizens across the nation have been pushing for more police
accountability for many years, but 2020 was the year the voices were finally
being heard and acknowledged. 211 Gradual movements in the right direction
will foster systemic improvement and ensure efficacy in police grievance
arbitrations. 212 The legislative process may not be the best way to make the
reforms the communities are hoping for, but it is not a terrible place to
start. 213
IV.

MINNESOTA’S RECENT CHANGES

Following the killing of George Floyd, Minnesota passed legislation
attempting to address the previously mentioned problems with police
discipline grievance arbitrations. George Floyd, a forty-six-year-old Black
man, was killed while being arrested by Minneapolis police officers on May
25, 2020, for allegedly buying cigarettes with a counterfeit twenty-dollar
bill. 214 Mr. Floyd’s death was captured on video and sparked protests across
the country and the world. 215 One demand protestors called for was the
resignation of Minneapolis Police Federation’s president, Bob Kroll.
Protestors gathered in June, calling for Kroll to resign because protestors
know change starts at the top. 216
Kroll was responsible for protecting White police officers while Black
police officers experienced discrimination, which led to the lawsuit that
Chief Arradondo and four other Black police officers brought in 2007. 217
210

211

Id. at 1074.
See id.; see also Kenny Lo, Assessing the State of Police Reform, CTR. AM. PROGRESS

(July 16, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminaljustice/news/2020/07/16/487721/assessing-state-police-reform/
[https://perma.cc/9XXKKP2Q]; George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021, H.R.1280, 117th Cong. (2021–2022).
See Lo, supra note 211; George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021, supra note 211.
See Lo, supra note 211; George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021, supra note 211.
How George Floyd Died, and What Happened Next, supra note 3. The New York Times
combined videos from bystanders and security cameras, reviewed official documents, and
reconstructed in detail the minutes leading to Mr. Floyd’s death. Evan Hill, Ainara
Tiefenthäler, Christiaan Triebert, Drew Jordan, Haley Willis & Robin Stein, How George
Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html
[https://perma.cc/L27N-B88U].
How George Floyd Died, and What Happened Next, supra note 3.
Brandt Williams, ‘Bob Kroll Has Got to Go’: Calls Grow for Minneapolis Police Union
Leader’s
Resignation,
MPR
NEWS
(June
12,
2020,
9:00
AM),
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2020/06/12/calls-for-mpd-union-leaders-resignation-growlouder [https://perma.cc/6TL7-CCLK].
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Accusations of Kroll’s racism predate his election to the union leadership
role. 218 Kroll sent a letter to the Minneapolis Police Federation members
(which retired MPD Chief Janeé Harteau posted on Twitter), trying to
change the narrative by focusing on Mr. Floyd’s “violent criminal history”
while describing the protests as a “terrorist movement.” 219 Kroll was clear in
his position that the union would fight the termination of the four officers
involved in the killing of Mr. Floyd. 220
Police discipline grievance arbitrations fosters unfortunate results. 221
Following George Floyd’s murder at the hands of a MPD officer, Governor
Tim Walz called special sessions of the Minnesota Legislature. 222 As a result,
the legislature passed the Minnesota Police Accountability Act (“PAA”). 223

218

Id.

Janeé Harteau (@ChiefHateau), TWITTER (June 1, 2020, 9:19 AM),
https://twitter.com/ChiefHarteau/status/1267460683408564225/photo/1
[https://perma.cc/C5RS-MK2P]. Chief Harteau was the fifty-second MPD chief of police;
she
served
as
chief
from
2012–2017.
William Bornhoft, Minneapolis Police Chief Janeé Harteau Resigns, PATCH (July 21, 2017,
6:04 PM), https://patch.com/minnesota/southwestminneapolis/minneapolis-police-chiefjanee-harteau-resigns [https://perma.cc/VKP3-S6VT].
Harteau, supra note 219.
Alan A. Symonette, Labor Arbitration and Police Discipline: Misperceptions and
Reforms,
AM.
BAR
ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/2021/midwinter/adr/mater
ials/labor-arb-and-police-discipline.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4VS-LD9L].
TIM WALZ, GOV. OF MINN., PROCLAMATION FOR SPECIAL SESSION 2020 (June 10, 2020),
https://mn.gov/governor/assets/06.10.2020%20Special%20Session%20Proclamation%20fin
al_tcm1055-435510.pdf [https://perma.cc/TUQ5-5UHV]. Governor Walz convened a total
of seven special sessions in 2020. Special Sessions of the Minnesota State Legislature and
the Minnesota Territorial Legislature, 1857–Present, MINN. LEG. REF. LIB,
https://www.lrl.mn.gov/history/spsess [https://perma.cc/23MA-YSRT]. The first two sessions
convened addressed the matter of policing in addition to other topics. See id.
H.F. 1, 91st Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Minn. 2020).
219

220

221

222

223

647

648

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:2

A. Police Accountability Act of 2020 224
The legislature passed the first version of the PAA on July 23, 2020, in
the second special session of 2020, called by Governor Walz. 225 The PAA
passed the Minnesota House by a vote of 102–29 and Minnesota Senate by
a vote of 60–7. 226 The PAA encompasses a variety of provisions including
implementation of stress management teams and public safety peer
counseling, a ban on choke holds and certain neck restraints, a reform for
the Peace Officer Standards and Training (“POST”) board, and reform to
the arbitration process. 227
Section 24 of the PAA added an additional section to the Peace Officer
chapter regarding the grievance arbitrator selection procedure. 228 With the
additional provision, the arbitrator selection is no longer in the hands of the
parties. This additional provision applies to all peace officers for “written
disciplinary action, discharge, or termination heard on or after [August 1,
2020].” 229 The PAA established a roster of six persons qualified by training
and experience to be arbitrators, specifically for peace officer grievance

Id. The PAA includes a variety of measures. Specific measures include: defining “public
safety peer counseling” and “critical incident stress management;” establishing a use of force
investigation unit within the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (“BCA”); allowing cities to
give peace officer applicants an incentive to be a resident of the city or county; restricting the
use of choke holds, tying of limbs, or securing a person in a way that results in transporting
the person face down in a vehicle; providing that authority to use deadly force is a critical
responsibility that must be exercised judiciously and with respect for human rights and dignity
and for the sanctity of every human life; limiting the use of deadly force and prohibits use of
deadly force against a person based on the danger the person poses to self; requiring the
chief to report each incident of use of force resulting in serious bodily injury or death to the
BCA; increasing the number of Peace Officer Standard Training (“POST”) board members;
prohibiting warrior style training; establishing a council under the POST board whose
purpose is to assist the board in maintaining policies regulating peace officers in a manner
that ensures the protection of civil and human rights; requires the POST board to develop a
“duty to intercede” model policy; requiring the chief officer to report cases involving alleged
police misconduct; and expanding peace officer training in cultural diversity, mental illness,
crisis intervention, and autism. See id.
224

225

226

227

Id.
Id.
Id.

H.F. 1, 91st Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Minn. 2020) (codified as amended at MINN. STAT.
§ 626.892 (2021)).
Id. § 24, subdiv. 2 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 626.892, subdiv. 1(d)). It does
not apply to any other public employee grievance arbitrations. See id.
228

229

648

2022]

POLICE GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION

649

arbitrations under the section. 230 These rostered arbitrators cannot serve as
an arbitrator in labor arbitration other than a grievance arbitration defined
in the section. 231 The terms for the arbitrators will be three years following
the initial appointments with staggering term expirations. 232 The appointed
arbitrators will be trained in cultural competency, racism, implicit bias,
cultural differences, daily experiences of peace officers (which may include
ride-alongs 233), and exposure to judgments required of officers in the field. 234
The Minnesota BMS Commissioner will assign or appoint either an
arbitrator or panel of arbitrators from the roster to a grievance arbitration. 235
Critics have said that the arbitration reform within the PAA did not go
far enough to dismantle the immunity culture established within the police
force. 236 Some saw the arbitration reform included in the PAA as a
disappointment because it did not go far enough. 237 There was a large push
for an overhaul of the arbitration system, but that was not the outcome. 238
Many critics claim the legislature should have gone farther to change the
arbitration procedures and ensure arbitrators do not end up in a cycle of
overturning disciplinary decisions made by chiefs of police. 239 Because
arbitrators post their awards on the BMS website, it is almost inevitable that
arbitrators and attorneys for both sides use the awards to help make their
230

231

232

Id. § 24, subdiv. 4 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 626.892, subdiv. 4).
Id. (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 626.892, subdiv. 4).
Id. § 24, subdiv. 6 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 626.892, subdiv. 6).

Police departments allow community members to accompany a police officer in their
squad car for a period of time to experience a patrol officer’s daily work. See Ride Alongs—
Experience a Day in the Life of an Officer, Ride-Alongs, ST. PAUL MINN. (Aug. 2, 2021),
https://www.stpaul.gov/departments/police/administration-office-chief/communityengagement-division/youth-outreach/ride [https://perma.cc/Z6Q4-HXQU].
H.F. 1, 91st Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. § 24, subdiv. 10 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. §
626.892, subdiv. 4, 10).
Id. § 24, subdiv. 11 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 626.892, subdiv. 11).
See Hilbert, supra note 136, at 226–27. “Governor Walz acknowledged that the law was
‘only the beginning’ and that ‘[t]he work does not end today.’” Id.
See LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, supra note 7. Following the passage of the PAA, the League
of Minnesota Cities (“League”) sent a letter to legislative leaders who worked on the
arbitration reform provision and expressed frustration with the outcome and requested that
the legislature continue to work on meaningful reform to the law enforcement arbitration
process. Id. Specifically, the League asked for a new reasonable standard of review required
of the arbitrator in police misconduct cases. Id.
See The Editorial Board, To Hold Police Accountable, Ax the Arbitrators, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/03/opinion/sunday/police-arbitrationreform-unions.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/V8M6-KB8C].
See LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, supra note 7, at 270 n.271 (citing resources establishing a
common effect when arbitrations are overturned by disciplinary acts made by police chiefs);
see also Rushin, supra note 137, at 1029.
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choice for their arbitrator. 240 This practice may be reduced with the new
roster system added in the PAA because the parties no longer have a role
in choosing which arbitrator, or arbitration panel, will be assigned for their
arbitration. 241 Taking away the parties’ choice will eliminate parties’ ability to
strike arbitrators they know will adversely impact their case and establish a
separation between the parties and the arbitrator. 242 The arbitrator
assignment process, specialized training, and term limits will hopefully
create a better opportunity for arbitrators to assess all facts and write more
consistent awards across the board. 243
A downfall with the new arbitrator roster is the restriction imposed on
the arbitrators. 244 The statute states any arbitrator serving on the roster may
only arbitrate peace officer grievance arbitrations and shall not serve as an
arbitrator in any other labor arbitrations. 245 This will likely limit the
applicants and draw applicants who are not current arbitrators. 246 The
established arbitrators likely will not want to give up the rest of their
arbitration practice to serve on the very specific roster. 247 However, having a
roster of new arbitrators may not end up being a downfall. 248 New arbitrators
will run their practice differently than the current arbitrators. 249 The new
arbitrators will force lawyers on both sides of the table to rework how they
prepare and present their side of the matter. 250 This will be good for the
lawyers because many labor lawyers have been working on these arbitrations
for many years and likely ended up in a routine for each arbitration. 251

See Irene Kao, Mike Stockstead, Gregg M. Corwin & Scott M. Lepak, Panel for Minn.
State Bar Ass’n: Police Arbitration Reform CLE (Nov. 20, 2020); see also MINN. BUREAU
240

OF MEDIATION SERV., https://mn.gov/bms/arbitration/awards/ [https://perma.cc/5YCQ7B34].
See Kao, et al., supra note 240.
See Rushin, supra note 137, at 1076.
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See id.
See Kao, et al., supra note 240.
MINN. STAT. § 626.892, subdiv. 4.
See Kao, et al., supra note 240.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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B. The Minneapolis Police Department Process 252
MPD’s collective bargaining agreement may be slightly different than
other departments, but disciplinary appeal procedure provisions are
relatively the same. The Police Officers’ Federation of Minneapolis labor
agreement lays out the steps for the disciplinary appeals and grievance
process. 253 The following paragraphs outline the current process for MPD’s
police officers to appeal disciplinary action against them, which in some
cases leads to binding arbitration. 254 The procedure may end after any step
if the employee is satisfied with the city’s response to the appeal. 255 “A
suspension, written reprimand, transfer, demotion (except during the
probationary period) or discharge of an employee who has completed the
required probationary period may be appealed through the grievance
procedure.” 256
First, the police officer’s union representative initiates the grievance by
notifying their commander in writing. 257 A discussion with the commander
must “take place within twenty-one (21) days after filing the grievance, unless
the time is mutually extended.” 258 After the meeting, the employer must give
its decision in writing with supporting reasons to the union, identified as a
“Step One Decision.” 259
Second, the union may file a written appeal if the Step One Decision
is not satisfactory. 260 Then, the union may expressly request a discussion with
the chief of police. 261 “The Chief may request the Director of Employee
Services to serve as a mediator between the Employer and the [Union] in
an attempt to resolve the grievance.” 262 The Director of Employee Services
does not have authority to compel either party to make a concession. 263
Within twenty-one days after the Step Two meeting, the employer must

THE CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS AND THE POLICE OFFICERS’ FEDERATION OF MINNEAPOLIS
LABOR
AGREEMENT,
POLICE
UNIT
§
11.02,
https://www2.minneapolismn.gov/media/content-assets/www2documents/departments/wcmsp-200131.pdf [https://perma.cc/225B-TBJY] [hereinafter
Agreement].
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256

257

258

259

260

261

262

263

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at § 12.02.
Id. at § 11.02, subdiv. 1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at § 11.02, subdiv. 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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send a written response to the police union. 264
Third, within twenty-one days of the Step Two Decision, the police
union has “the right to submit the matter to arbitration by informing the
Director of Employee Services that the matter is to be arbitrated.” 265 A single
arbitrator is selected from a panel of mutually agreed upon arbitrators
maintained in accordance with the procedure laid out in an attachment. 266
Arbitrators are selected from a panel on a rotating basis. 267 This section of
the agreement will be the most impacted by the PAA. 268 The new arbitration
roster will make the arbitrator selection language moot. 269 Instead of the
parties choosing the arbitrator based on the agreed upon procedure, the
BMS will notify the parties which arbitrator is next on the list
alphabetically. 270
The arbitrator shall render a written decision and the reasons,
therefore resolving the grievance, and order any appropriate
relief within thirty (30) days following the close of the hearing or
the submission of briefs by the parties. The decision and award
of the arbitrator shall be final and binding upon the City, the
[Union] and the employee(s) affected.
The arbitrator shall have no authority to amend, modify, nullify,
ignore, add to, or subtract from the provisions of [the] agreement.
The arbitrator is also prohibited from making any decision that is
contrary to law or to public policy. 271
In a 2020 arbitration award involving the City of Minneapolis, the
arbitrator wrote that in disciplinary matters it is “nearly universal that
management first establish that the accused employee is indeed guilty as
charged.” 272 If that is accomplished, then the employer needs to
“demonstrate that the discipline administered was fair and reasonable when

264

265

266

267

268

269

270

271

Id.
Id. at § 11.02, subdiv. 3.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.

Police Officers’ Fed’n of Minneapolis v. City of Minneapolis, Minneapolis Minnesota,
BUREAU OF MEDIATION SERV.: ARB. AWARDS, 1, 9 (2020) (Fogelberg, Arb.),
https://mn.gov/bms/documents/BMS/243465-Award%20%20Police%20Officers%20Federation%20of%20Minneapolis%20and%20City%20of%20M
inneapolis.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RWG-835L].
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all relevant factors are considered.” 273
After the PAA passed, the MPD labor agreement’s grievance appeal
process will likely remain the same. The only change will be the arbitrator
who presides over the grievance. The BMS website lists the six arbitrators
on the Peace Officer Grievance Arbitrator Roster. 274 At a continuing legal
education (“CLE”) event sponsored by the Minnesota State Bar Association
Public Law Section, which was moderated by Irene Kao, two experienced
labor lawyers, Scott Lepak and Gregg M. Corwin, discussed the impact of
the PAA. 275 A key part of the discussion surrounded the limited
appointments to the roster. Because the arbitrators are limited in the cases
they can hear while they are on the roster, the arbitrators who are currently
hearing the grievance arbitrations are not applying to be on the roster, likely
because they do not want to give up hearing other matters. 276
Two of the six arbitrators currently on the roster have been arbitrators
before, while the remaining four have limited to no experience being an
arbitrator. 277 However, these new arbitrators may benefit the process
because the rostered arbitrators likely will not hear the arbitrations in the
same way as the pre-PAA arbitrators. 278 This change will force the lawyers
on both sides of the table to adjust the way they prepare and present their
side of the case. 279

C. Alternative Options
There are three alternative options for police officers to grieve
discipline: Veterans Preference, 280 civil service commissions, and personnel
boards. The Veterans Preference Act governs preference of a veteran under
the civil service laws. 281 Minnesota Statutes section 197 defines a veteran as
someone “who has been separated under honorable conditions from any
branch of the armed forces of the United States after having served on active
duty for 181 consecutive days” or became disabled while serving on active
duty. 282 If the veteran is outside the probationary period for their position
and receives notification of dismissal, the veteran has two options for
grieving the dismissal: Veterans Preference or the grievance procedures
273

Id. at 9–10.
Peace Officer Grievance Arbitration Roster, BUREAU

OF MEDIATION SERVS.,
https://mn.gov/bms/arbitration/pogarbitration/ [https://perma.cc/4PGH-PGCW].
See Kao, et al., supra note 240.
274

275

276

277

278

279

280

281

282

See id.
Peace Officer Grievance Arbitration Roster, supra note 274.
See Kao, et al., supra note 240.
See id.
MINN. STAT. § 197.46 (2021).
MINN. STAT. § 197.455, subdiv. 1 (2021).
MINN. STAT. § 197.447 (2021).
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included in the collective bargaining agreement, but not both. 283 If a police
officer chooses to go through the Veterans Preference grievance procedure,
the arbitrator roster does not apply. 284 A civil services board or commission,
a merit authority, or an arbitrator presides over Veteran Preference
Hearings. 285
A key difference that would entice an employee to choose the Veterans
Preference route rather than the collective bargaining procedure is that the
employee would be paid until there is a decision under the Veterans
Preference procedure, which is not the case otherwise. 286 However, once an
employee requests a Veterans Preference hearing, the right to pursue the
grievance under the collective bargaining agreement is terminated. 287
Other options may be civil service commissions or personnel boards. 288
These options are not as appealing because the civil service commissions
and personnel boards are typically selected by the city council, which is
essentially the same as the employer, so the outcome likely would not be in
the employee’s favor. 289
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To effectuate meaningful change, the police grievance arbitration
system, which is consistently reinstating police officers after termination and
reversing discipline imposed by the police chief, should be dismantled and
rebuilt because the PAA did not go far enough to achieve the desired result.
The PAA made a minor change; it will bring in new people hearing
arbitrations and perhaps running the arbitrations differently, 290 but the
outcomes probably will not be dramatically different. This change looks at
the problem backwards. Police officers are licensed, so if an arbitrator
reinstates a police officer, but then the police officer has a hearing in front
of the POST 291 board, the police officer can lose their license. If the officer
goes in front of the POST board before the grievance arbitration, then
reinstatement may not be an option because if the police officer’s license is
283

284

See MINN. STAT. § 197.46(b); Agreement, supra note 252.
See LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, supra note 16.

MINN. STAT. § 197.46(c).
See id.; see also LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, VETERANS PREFERENCE IN DISCIPLINE,
DISCHARGE
OR
JOB
ELIMINATION
4–5
(2021),
https://www.lmc.org/wpcontent/uploads/documents/Veterans-Preference-in-Discipline-Discharge-or-JobElimination.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3BH-LM3S].
MINN. STAT. § 197.455 subdiv. 1.
MINN. STAT § 197.46; Peace Officer Grievance Arbitration Roster, supra note 274.
See MINN. STAT. § 419.02 (2021) (police civil service commission); see also MINN. STAT.
§ 375.65 (2021) (personnel board).
See supra Part IV.A.
MINN. STAT. § 626.8432 (2021).
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revoked by the POST board, the arbitrator may not reinstate the police
officer. 292
Consequently, focusing on the police grievance arbitration system is a
good place to start because the longer police departments are unable to
clean house and start a new culture of community policing, the more
innocent Black people will be killed by police officers. 293 The courts have
the power to make the changes necessary to the arbitration system through
the narrow public policy exception. 294 However, they have repeatedly chosen
not to use the power to make the change, even when the outcome is contrary
to the public outcry. 295 The courts cannot be relied on to vacate arbitrator’s
awards, especially because the public policy exception is so narrow. 296 To
make the necessary changes to ensure police chiefs have autonomy to run
their departments with the culture they want to see, the state legislature must
change the statutory guidelines surrounding grievance arbitrations or cities
must start to negotiate differently during discussions with unions in the
drafting phase.
Changing the provisions to include more specific disciplinary options
and definitions of just cause may start to encourage a shift. If the legislature
is not prepared or able to convince police unions to get on board with
substantive changes to the police grievance arbitration procedures, then
cities need to be armed with ammunition to negotiate collective bargaining
agreements with the unions. The PAA likely put the foot in the door to
change the process but did not do enough to overhaul the procedures as
they stand right now.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Police discipline grievance arbitrations are not going away because they
are statutorily required. A key issue with the police discipline grievance
arbitration is the number of police officers reinstated after termination. The
reinstatement of a police officer after termination makes a chief of police’s
job more difficult because they cannot manage the culture of their
department. However, because of the statutory nature of these grievance
procedures, the changes need to come from the legislature or adjusting the
language in the governing collective bargaining agreements. Minnesota’s
PAA’s reform of police discipline grievance arbitrations was an attempt
address this issue.
There are two sides to every situation and the passage of the PAA is
no different. The PAA’s changes are a start to improving policing in
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See MINN. STAT. § 626.8432.
See supra text accompanying notes 184–86.
See supra Part II.D.
See supra Part II.E.
See supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text.
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Minnesota and adjusting the police grievance arbitration system to respond
to requests for change. Whether the changes went far enough to effectuate
change remains unclear. Moving forward, community members should
keep this issue on the legislature floor by contacting their representatives
and encouraging changes. Additionally, the community needs to continue
to be vocal about the change they want to see. Keeping the conversation
going will ensure police accountability remains a key topic of discussion on
the floor of the legislature.
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